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Niles Hansen*

Economic Growth Patterns in the

Texas Borderlands
The nature and significance of economic growth patterns in the Texas
borderlands cannot be understood by treating the region as though it
existed in a vacuum. Thus, in addition to describing the recent evolution
of the border economy, this paper attempts to identify the major national
and international development processes that will continue to influence
the region's growth in the foreseeable future. In particular, it is necessary
to examine manufacturing decentralization in the United States, as well
as broader considerations involving the international division of labor.

MANUFACTURING DECENTRALIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
Between 1968 and 1978, manufacturing employment in the United
States increased by fewer than 700,000 workers; during this period the
share of total employment accounted for by manufacturing declined from
27 percent to 22 percent. However, the aggregate picture masks important
differences among broad regions of the country. Essentially, manufacturing activity has been shifting from the Northeast and North Central
regions-roughly the traditional industrial heartland-to the South and
West. Manufacturing employment in the Northeast declined by almost
800,000 workers between 1968 and 1978. The North Central region
registered a gain of 200,000 manufacturing jobs, but this was caused
primarily by growth in the historically less industrialized states west of
the Mississippi River. Meanwhile, factory employment increased by over
900,000 jobs in the South and by over 300,000 in the West. In addition,
throughout the country manufacturing activities have been decentralizing
from large metropolitan areas to smaller cities and rural areas.
Manufacturing decentralization can be explained in large part in terms
of the related concepts of product life cycles and spatial industrial filtering.
*Department of Economics, The University of Texas at Austin. Research for this paper was
supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the Mexico-United States Border Research
Program of the University of Texas at Austin.
I. Rones, Moving to the Sun: Regional Job Growth 1968 to 1978, 103 MONTHLY LABOR
REV. 12-19 (March 1980).
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A product life cycle may be divided somewhat arbitrarily into three phases:
early, growth, and mature. In the early phase, scientific and engineering
skills are the critical human inputs. Because of the relatively short production runs associated with a changing technology, capital outlays are
relatively low. Producers depend instead on external economies and subcontracting. In the growth phase, the capital-to-labor ratio is increased
by the introduction of mass production techniques. Management skills
are vital in this phase. Finally, in the mature phase there is little technological innovation; the product is manufactured in long, routine production runs. Cheap, low-skill labor becomes the key human input, but
capital intensity may remain high because large amounts of specialized
equipment often can be used. In order to remain competitive, corporations
respond to changing input needs-corresponding to differing phases of
the product cycle-by changing the geographic location of production.
Thus, corporations increasingly manufacture multiple products in multiple
branch plants in multiple locations. But the lower an area in the skill and
wage hierarchy, the older an industry or product tends to be when it
arrives, and the slower its national rate of growth.
One may ask how areas corresponding to the upper rungs of the hierarchy survive if they tend to lose activities that inevitably become
routine. The answer is that they continue to renew themselves by creating
new, relatively sophisticated activities. For example, New England, which
lacks natural resources, has relied heavily upon the quality of its human
resources to adapt to change and maintain economic progress. Contrary
to conventional Sunbelt-Frostbelt wisdom, "one of the ironies of current
public policy as viewed from a New England perspective is that allocation
formulas for public funds and other federal aids for regional economic
transitions are becoming more favorable and available to New England
just as the worst of its own transition problems may be at an end." '2 In
terms of employment created, New England is the U.S. region most
favored by foreign investors, who apparently give top priority in their
investment decisions to proximity to relevant markets. Second comes
availability of labor, with cost, quality and attitude considered important
but degree of unionization admitted to be only a minor consideration. 3
New England is near major U.S. and Canadian markets and is relatively
close to Europe. Within-industry wage rates in New England are just
higher than those in the Southeast but lower than those elsewhere. In
addition, high technology companies are attracted by the region's skilled
2. Meyer and Leone, The New England States and Their Economic Future, 68 AM. ECON.
REV. 114 (May 1978).
3. Little, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Recent Locational Choices of Foreign
Manufacturers, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV. 16 (Nov.-Dec. 1980).
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labor force, its concentrations of universities and consulting companies,
and its favorable quality of life.
California is a relatively high-wage state but it nonetheless accounted
for 19 percent of all new jobs created in the United States in 1978. The
aerospace and electronics industries, which have given particular impetus
to California's recent growth, reflect the continuing creation of new activities. Most of the manufacturing activities in California were virtually
non-existent thirty years ago. 4
A revolution in information technology is creating the most massive
restructuring of New York City's economy since the Industrial Revolution.
For over a hundred years, most New Yorkers earned their living by
converting materials into products. Fewer and fewer of these activities
are surviving. Between 1969 and 1976, New York City lost nearly 600,000
jobs, 70,000 of them in the garment trade alone. In their place are activities that exploit the new micro-technology of computer-linked communications to the fullest. Information has become a major form of wealth
and New York City is becoming the information capital not just of the
United States, but of the world.'
Meanwhile, in keeping with the product cycle and spatial-filtering
paradigm, traditional manufacturing activities have been moving to the
Texas borderlands.
MANUFACTURING GROWTH IN THE TEXAS
BORDERLANDS
As the data in Table 1 indicate, average weekly manufacturing wages
in the Texas borderlands are low. In 1978, the range for the four major
labor market areas in the region was from $151 to $179. The only other
major Texas labor market area with a weekly average wage below $200
was Bexar County, which essentially is San Antonio. (A case could in
fact be made for including San Antonio in the borderlands; its population
is over half Mexican-American, and the definition of the San Antonio
functional economic region made by the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. Department of Commerce, includes five counties that border Mexico.')
The high levels of unemployment prevailing in the Texas borderlands
are another indication that the regional labor market is anything but tight.
In the first quarter of 1980, the metropolitan unemployment rate in El
Paso was 9.5 percent; in Laredo, 14.4 percent; in McAllen, 14.2 percent;
4. Immel, California and Other States in the Sun Belt Seem Likely to Weather a Recession Well,
Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1979 at 34.
5. Smith, Info City, NEW YORK 24-29 (Feb. 9, 1981).
6. N. HANSEN, THE BORDER ECONOMY 7-10, 168 (1981).
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TABLE 1
AVERAGE WEEKLY MANUFACTURING WAGES IN SELECTED
TEXAS COUNTIES, 1978
Major City

County

Weekly Wage

Borderlands
El Paso
Webb
Hidalgo
Cameron

El Paso
Laredo
McAllen
Brownsville

Bexar
Dallas
Harris
Jefferson
Nueces
Orange
Tarrant
Travis

San Antonio
Dallas
Houston
Port Arthur
Corpus Christi
Beaumont
Ft. Worth
Austin

$179
155
151
157

Rest of Texas

$188
241
266
260
210
270
218
202

Source: Texas Employment Commission

and in Brownsville, 11.4 percent. 7 In the United States as a whole, the
Laredo and McAllen rates were exceeded only by Anderson, Indiana
(16.8 percent), whose economy is based on the troubled auto industry.
Given these conditions, it is not surprising that the borderlands area
has attracted firms that must survive on very narrow profit margins. Thus,
for example, while apparel manufacturing is becoming a thing of the past
in New York City and other former garment-making centers, it is thriving
in Texas. Over the past decade, apparel employment in Texas increased
by 40 percent, to 90,000 workers. A recent investigation of this phenomenon concludes that El Paso is the cheapest and most efficient place in
the world to make jeans, although the situation is similar all along the
Texas borderlands .

Between 1965 and 1979, manufacturing employment in the United
States increased by only 15 percent. 9 The data presented in Table 2 show
that from 1963 to 1979 employment in this sector more than doubled in
the El Paso, Laredo, and Brownsville metropolitan areas, and more than
tripled in the McAllen metropolitan area. For the four areas as a whole,
manufacturing employment rose by 134 percent during this period. Yet
7. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMINIS., AREA TRENDS IN
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 39, 52-53 (1980).
8. Berman and Mack, Renaissance on the Rio Grande, FORBES 38-40 (Sept. 1, 1980).
9. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1979, 408 (1979).
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TABLE 2
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN TEXAS BORDERLANDS METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1963, 1967, 1972, AND 1979
1963
El Paso
Laredo
McAllen
Brownsville
Total

14,916
915
2,652
4,817
23,300

1967

1972

1979

18,900
700
2,400
5,400
27,400

26,000
1,000
3,100
6,900
37,100

31,550
2,020
9,730
11,220
54,520

Source: Texas Employment Commission

as recently as 1976, the proportion of total employment accounted for
by manufacturing in the 24 Texas counties then included in the Southwest
Border Regional Commission was only 14 percent; the corresponding
national figure was 22 percent."0 Similarly, the data presented in Table 3
indicate that in 1978 manufacturing accounted for 26 percent of all labor
and proprietors in the United States; however, in the four Texas borderlands metropolitan areas the corresponding value ranged from about 6
percent in Laredo to only 18 percent in Brownsville.
There are several explanations for this situation. First, although the
growth of factory employment in the borderlands has proceeded at a rapid
rate, the base from which it began was extremely low. Second, as pointed
out in the previous section, many manufacturing activities are not attracted
solely by the presence of cheap labor (usually termed a "large supply"
of labor in the Texas booster literature). On balance, the borderlands area
does not have the total "package" of advantages offered by other locations, especially where relatively sophisticated activities are concerned.
Third, employment in furtive sweatshops that pay as little as $1 per hour
may go unrecorded, though it is not certain that the rate of growth of
such employment has differed from that of officially-recorded employment. Finally, the manufacturing growth potential of the borderlands is
constrained by the fact that firms in search of cheap labor can go just
beyond the border into Mexico, where wages are even lower than on the
U.S. side.
THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
In the past, third world countries tended to be regarded as sources of
raw materials for Western factories as well as markets for Western-produced goods. However, a new international division of labor has been
evolving. Essentially it involves a major geographic extension of loca10. HANSEN, supra note 6, at 70, 72.
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tional factors that already have been in evidence within the United States
and other Western countries: the decomposition of complex production
processes, better transportation technologies, improved telecommunications systems, and cheap labor. Under these conditions, U.S. corporations
have established profitable manufacturing plants in such distant places as
Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong; and increasingly they have been
expanding into Mexican border cities.
The principal vehicle for manufacturing expansion south of the border
has been the maquiladora(assembly plant) program. Begun in the middle
1960s and formalized in the early 1970s, it allows the temporary importation into Mexico of foreign materials for local assembly, with the condition that the final products be exported. The program was specifically
designed to take advantage of U.S. Tariff Items 806 and 807, which
permit foreign-based subsidiaries of U.S. firms to assemble products
whose components were originally made in the United States, and to
export the products to the United States with duties imposed only on the
value added. The advantages of the program for U.S. corporations are
the low cost of Mexican labor, the fact that only labor inputs are subject
to tariffs, and the proximity of Mexican border cities. In 1980, for example, the cost of labor in Ciudad Judrez was $1.33 per hour, including
all fringe benefits and taxes. Although there are lower-wage areas in other
parts of the world, the difference frequently is more than offset by the
presence of better-developed infrastructure and other external economies
in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, lower costs of shipping machinery and
materials to foreign plants and of importing finished or nearly-finished
goods, and the fact that U.S. managers can live in the United States and
still work abroad.
Initially, most maquiladoras were small and utilized converted old
buildings and little capital. However, over the past decade there has been
a steadily increasing trend in favor of greater capital intensity and the
use of large new plants in modern industrial parks. By 1978, Mexico was
"predominant among the several countries participating in labour-intensive sub-contracting for the United States market both in terms of growth
and in terms of the absolute value-added by offshore processers."II In
that year, maquiladoras provided Mexico some 95,000 jobs and $713
million in value-added, which represented over 70 percent of the total
value-added in this type of production in all of Latin America. Only
tourism and petroleum sales provide more foreign exchange to Mexico.
At present, maquiladora employment is estimated to be over 130,000
workers. Ciudad Judrez, with its booming "Little Detroits," accounts for
1I. Newton and Balli, Mexican In-Bond Industry, DIRECTOR'S REPORT, UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 21-24 (1979).
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115 plants and 40,000 workers. Comparing these data with those presented in Table 2, it can be seen that maquiladoraemployment in Ciudad
Jud.rez is about one-third greater than manufacturing employment in its
sister city El Paso, which itself accounts for well over half of all such
employment in Texas borderlands metropolitan areas.
From the perspective of the United States as a whole, lower production
costs in the Mexican border industry mean lower prices for U.S. consumers. Nevertheless, U.S. labor unions, which oppose the maquiladora
program on the ground that it takes jobs from domestic workers, continue
to exert pressure on Congress to remove the tariff advantages enjoyed by
U.S. corporations operating abroad. In fact, there is little evidence that
the "runaway" plants would have been established in the United States
if they had not been lured to Mexico. Some of the products now assembled
in maquiladoraswould be dropped altogether if they had to be produced
with higher cost and sometimes less efficient U.S. labor. 2 Still other
corporations would move their operations to other labor surplus countries
if the advantages of locating on the border were curtailed. Moreover, the
proximity of Mexico's border cities creates balance of payments and
indirect employment advantages for the United States in relation to locating in distant countries. Maquiladoras use more U.S. materials and
machinery because of the relatively low transportation costs involved,
and maquiladoraworkers spend a significant part of their earnings in the
United States. The growth of the maquiladoraindustry as such is not the
real problem for the United States. Rather, what is at issue is the problenm--common to all industrial countries-of adaptation to the evolving
international division of labor. The United States is in danger of losing
out in the modem growth race to the extent that it directly or indirectly
protects and subsidizes domestic industries that no longer have a comparative advantage in the international marketplace. To move into new,
innovative activities requires a transfer of labor and capital from old,
lower-productivity activities, which may nonetheless be welcome in relatively low-wage countries. For the most part, however, U.S. policy
makers have yet to recognize the need for adjustment policies designed
to deal systematically with the domestic consequences of a more efficient
international division of labor.
It often is argued that proximity to Mexico has placed the Texas borderlands at a distinct economic disadvantage in relation to the rest of the
United States, largely because of the ubiquitous presence of Mexican
workers, who enter as legal commuters or on an undocumented basis.
Although employers may welcome this labor source, the Mexican presence has served to depress wages and employment opportunities for the
12. Murray, American Boom in Mexico, 112 DUN'S REV. 119-27 (Oct. 1978).
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majority of U.S. citizen workers in the borderlands. U.S. government
policies, it is claimed, have contributed at least tacitly to this situation,
yet most of the problems are concentrated along the border and among
Mexican Americans (whose stake in this issue will be considered later),
rather than diffused throughout the nation. The fact that undocumented
Mexican workers have increasingly been going to cities in the U.S.
interior still does not alter the relatively disadvantageous position of the
borderlands.
In contrast, it should also be recognized that the growth of Mexico's
border industry has generated significant benefits for the U.S. borderlands,
especially if it is admitted that the plants locating in Mexico would not
have located on the U.S. side of the border. For one thing, the work
being done in maquiladorasusually is linked to complementary activities
in plants located in the United States. In 1979, for example, "twin plants"
in El Paso employed 3,200 workers; the corresponding payroll was nearly
$17 million. 13 However, the extent to which twin plant linkages primarily
benefit the borderlands can easily be exaggerated. A 1979 survey showed
that 1,077 suppliers in 36 states were furnishing raw materials, equipment,
or services to the maquiladoras in Ciudad Jud.rez. Of this number, 270
were located in Illinois; Texas ranked second with 184 suppliers, but
many of these were not located in the borderlands. Nevertheless, $21
million was spent in El Paso for transportation
services related to ma4
quiladoraproduction in Ciudad Judrez. 1
The unique benefits accruing to the U.S. borderlands as a result of
maquiladoragrowth-and indeed from the general economic expansion
of Mexico's border cities-are found primarily in retail trade. A French
student of the borderlands points out that:
Taken as a whole, the interdependence of the tertiary sectors is
not symmetric. Nearly all of the expenditures of the North Americans
remain in their country, whereas from 40 percent to 75 percent of
the outlays of Mexican families are made across the border. The
local market has been captured by the United States. And if the
overall balance of transactions remains positive for Mexico, it is
thanks to the large waves of tourists who come from the interior of
the United States, and thanks to the superior purchasing power of
the North Americans. '5
The importance of retail trade in the local economies of the Texas
borderlands metropolitan areas is shown in Table 3. In both 1971 and
13. W. Mitchell, Economic Impact of the Maquiladora Industry in Juarez on El Paso, Texas, and
Other Sections of the United States for 1979 (unpublished paper, 1980).
14. Id.
15. Revel-Mouroz, Economiefrontaliereet organisation de 'espace: rflexions d partir de 'exempie de lafrontiereMexique-Etats-Unis, 18 CAHIERS DES AMERIQUES LATINES 15 (1979).
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1978, the proportion of total labor and proprietors income accounted for
by the retail trade sector was higher in each area than in the United States
as a whole. Laredo's share of income from retail trade is twice that for
the United States. In contrast, the higher-order services represented by
the finance-insurance-real estate (FIRE) sector play a relatively small role
in each of the four areas.
THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BORDERLANDS
POPULATION
In an earlier study, I reported a highly significant inverse relationship
between per capita income (1974) and percent of hispanic-origin population (1970) in all cities along the U.S. border with Mexico that had a
population of 25,000 or more in 1975.16 In each of the relevant cities in
California, Arizona, and New Mexico, the hispanic group made up less
than half of the total population. However, in Texas this group accounted
for 58 percent of the population in El Paso; 65 percent in Del Rio; 86
percent in Laredo; 69 percent in McAllen; 64 percent in Harlingen; and
86 percent in Brownsville. The regression equation relating per capita
income (Y) and proportion of the population that is hispanic (X) for these
Texas cities is Y = a - 38X. The equation implies that if there were
no hispanics, per capita income would be $5530 (the Y-intercept). But
for each increase of 1 percentage point in the proportion of hispanics,
per capita income would be reduced by $38. Even though there are only
six pairs of observations, the r 2 value of .89 is significant at the .02 level.
Of course, the high degree of association found here between per capita
income and proportion of hispanics does not mean that the latter variable
in itself explains the former. In addressing the issue of why this association
exists, such factors as education, discrimination, and degree of competition from Mexican workers would need to be investigated in detail. In
addition, the cross-sectional nature of the present analysis does not take
into account the dynamic factors involved in the changing social and
economic status of Mexican Americans. Such recent evidence as does
exist in fact suggests that in terms of educational attainment and earnings
in relation to the rest of the population, the Mexican American population
has been making advances.' 7
The data presented in Table 4 show that in 1978 per capita personal
income in El Paso ($5639) was considerably higher than in the other
Texas borderlands metropolitan areas. This is probably due to the large
federal government presence in El Paso. The main component in this
16. HANSEN, supra note 6, at 142-45. The data were taken' from U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, CITY AND COUNTY DATA BOOK 1977, 600-625, 708-19, and 751-57 (1978).
17. HANSEN, supra note 6, at 131-42.
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TABLE 4
PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME IN TEXAS BORDERLANDS
METROPOLITAN AREAS AND IN THE UNITED STATES, 1971 AND
1978
1971

1978

% change
1971-1978

El Paso
Laredo
McAllen
Brownsville

$3201
2260
2045
2436

$5639
4529
4323
5024

76.2
100.4
111.4
106.2

United States

4132

7840

89.7

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Local Area Personal Income
1971-76, Vol. 7, Southwest Region 1, 96, 116, 134, 200 (1978); and U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Local Area Personal Income 1973-1978, Vol.
7, Southwest Region 3, 62, 72, 82, 115 (1980).

sector is the Fort Bliss military complex, which is the headquarters of

the U.S. Army Air Defense Center as well as a training center for the
U.S. Army and the West German Air Force. In 1971, the combined
federal, civilian, and military sectors accounted for 21 percent of total
labor and proprietors income in El Paso (see Table 3). The corresponding
figure for 1978 was about 17 percent; the military proportion was especially high: 9.8 percent in comparison with a national figure of 1.5 percent.
In no other borderlands metropolitan area was the military proportion
greater than 0.4 percent in 1978. It may be noted that the military component in Laredo fell from 14.5 percent to 0.2 percent between 1971 and
1978 due to the closing of an air base. Nevertheless, between these two
years per capita personal income in Laredo grew by over 100 percent,
compared with 76 percent in El Paso and about 90 percent for the nation
(see Table 4). Per capita income growth during the same period was even
more rapid in Brownsville (106 percent) and in McAllen (111 percent).
In general, the data in Table 4 indicate a convergence of per capita
income levels among the Texas borderlands metropolitan areas, as well
as a convergence between per capita income in the United States and that
in each of the borderlands areas except El Paso. The absolute per capita
income gap between the nation and the borderlands remains large, yet
there are two ameliorating factors. One is the relatively low cost of living
in the borderlands. A management consulting firm estimates that a family
earning $28,678 in El Paso can live as well as a family earning $30,000
in the "typical" U.S. city. 8 And field survey results indicate that the cost
of living in Laredo is 85 percent of that in Houston; in Brownsville, it
18. Costs of Living, Wall St. J., May 5, 1980 at 44.
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TABLE 5
BIRTHS PER THOUSAND POPULATION IN TEXAS BORDERLANDS
METROPOLITAN AREAS, THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1970 AND 1975
1970

1975

El Paso
Laredo
McAllen
Brownsville
Texas

26.0
33.1
32.0
28.8
20.6

21.6
27.2
28.6
27.1

United States

18.4

14.8

17.6

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 3, 549, 559, 569.

is only 82 percent of the Houston level.' 9 Also, per capita income data
include all persons regardless of age. Thus, places where average family
size is relatively large would fare better in terms of family income comparisons with other places than they would in terms of per capita income
comparisons. Birth rates in the Texas borderlands are falling as they are
in the rest of the country (Table 5), yet they remain relatively high in
every borderlands metropolitan area. In 1975, the birth rates in Laredo,
McAllen and Brownsville were almost twice the national rate. In the
United States as a whole, only one metropolitan area (Provo, Utah, 35.1)
had a 1975 birth rate higher than that of McAllen. El Paso's rate of 21.6
was exceeded only by six non-borderlands metropolitan areas. The latter
were characterized either by a high proportion of Mormons (Provo, Salt
Lake City) or the dominance of a local military base (Clarksville, Tennessee; Fayetteville, North Carolina; Killeen, Texas; and Lawton, Oklahoma).
ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE
To date the forecasting record of regional econometric analysis has
been disappointing. Most models are miniature versions of national forecasting models, with little attention given to the relevance of national
model structures and time horizons to regional analysis. "The results of
the research undertaken so far have been weakened by severe data limitations, too few observations, the reliance on static models, their recursive structure, the heavy dependence on national exogenous variables and
the neglect of space." 20
19. Smith and Newman, Depressed Wages Along the U.S.-Mexico Border:An EmpiricalAnalysis,
15 ECON. INQUIRY 51-66 (Jan. 1977).
20. H. RICHARDSON, REGIONAL ECONOMICS 214-15 (1979).
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Although it is still difficult to anticipate in detail the economic future
of regions, one may nonetheless with some humility at least attempt to
outline the general shape of development over the next two decades.
Moreover, because there is little prospect that the Texas borderlands will
be a source of major innovations during this period, it should be less
difficult to discuss its future than would be the case for centers of innovation such as those discussed previously.
Agriculture or ranching has been the mainstay of many counties in the
Texas borderlands. In terms of total activity, this has been especially so
in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, which accounts for over three-fourths
of the cash receipts for all crops grown in border counties. 2" Texas Employment Commission estimates indicate that agricultural employment in
Cameron and Hidalgo counties remained steady throughout the 1970s,
at about 12,000 workers. 22 However, the picture is in fact much more
complex because official data do not reflect the presence of Mexicans,
and migrant and seasonal farmworkers present special problems. Estimates of the total number of agricultural workers who live in the Valley
at some time during the year vary widely and are unreliable; yet they
invariably put this total at many times the average annual local agricultural
employment level. In any event, water constraints and increasing mechanization will limit agricultural employment opportunities. The future
growth of the borderlands economy will have to be based on other activities.
Manufacturing employment will probably continue to increase, though
not as rapidly as in the maquiladorason the Mexican side of the border.
However, given the symbiotic relationships that exist between border
cities, maquiladora growth will benefit the U.S. side because of the
complementary activities and retail sales that will be generated. There
may also be opportunities to upgrade the types of industries locating in
the borderlands, as well as the skills and incomes of industrial workers.
The South provides evidence that this can be achieved despite initial
dependence on low-wage, slow-growth sectors. The industrialization of
the South was initiated in large measure by the movement of textile mills
from New England and other northern areas into the Piedmont region of
the central Carolinas. The textile mills in turn generated other activities.
For example, by 1970 there werq 214 establishments in the South producing machinery for the textile industry, and 65 chemical plants were
producing synthetic fibers. Most of these plants were located where textile
21. Governors of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, Application for Designation as
a Title V Regional Action Planning Commission, D22, submitted to the U.S. Dept. of Commerce
July 1976.
22. LOWER RIO GRANDE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, OVERALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 69 (Nov. 1977).
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production was concentrated. Similar phenomena occurred as manufacturing decentralized successively to Georgia, the Tennessee Valley, Mississippi, and Arkansas. Moreover, as general upgrading occurred, further
efforts to promote industrialization no longer relied on cheap labor and
subsidies as selling points.23
An editorial in the Wall Street Journal stated that Mexican-Americans
in San Antonio have "a valid point" in insisting that San Antonio development promoters not use cheap labor in their sales talks; and it also
pointed out that relocated plant managers in the Southwest are "full of
praise" for the Mexican-American work force.2 4 Given the new international division of labor, it would seem rational that even more lowwage activities be performed abroad, with a concomitant upgrading of
the activities performed in this country, including the borderlands. Yet
there is a difficulty here not found, for example, in the industrializing
South. This is the presence of Mexicans willing to work for low wages.
Mexican-American organizations generally oppose strict measures to curtail undocumented Mexican workers, partly because of a shared culture
and partly because the harassment of Mexicans inevitably leads to the
harassment of some Mexican-Americans. (Mexican-American labor leaders have been ambivalent in this regard, but they primarily object to the
use of Mexican workers as strike breakers.) This highly complicated issue
cannot be resolved here.
For the foreseeable future, federal civilian employment and earnings
in the borderlands will grow relatively slowly. This assumes that the
Reagan Administration's austere federal spending and employment objectives are realized in significant degree. With the possible exception of
El Paso, where federal civilian income accounts for a relatively high
proportion of total personal income, the effects of the federal civilian
slowdown are likely to be much the same in the borderlands as in the
nation as a whole. However, virtually-assured large increases in military
spending will probably accelerate El Paso's growth, but have little impact
in the other borderlands metropolitan areas.
Finally, the future of the U.S. borderlands depends in part on the nature
and extent of economic development in Mexico's border cities. Maquiladora activity has already been discussed in this regard. More generally
significant is the fact that the Mexican government has been initiating
regional-sector planning efforts intended to promote rural development
and rapid (though more decentralized) industrialization. The direct use
of massive oil and gas resources, as well as revenues derived from their
sale abroad, give Mexico a unique opportunity to realize its objectives.
23. N. HANSEN, THE FUTURE OF NONMETROPOLITAN AMERICA 163-64 (1973).
24. The Private Sector Social Revolution, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1979 at 22.
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Reynosa, for example, is already an important petrochemical center, and
relatively well-paid Pemex employees spend a large proportion of their
income across the border. Natural gas from fields in northeastern Mexico
was once piped to Texas, but in recent years it has been sent instead to
Monterrey, Monclava, and Chihuahua. But Mexico could decide to complete a projected pipeline from Chiapas to Texas that would transport gas
from the south to the United States, via Reynosa.2 5 In the long run, the
successful development of interior growth centers in Mexico could also
reduce the number of migrants flowing to Mexican border cities as well
as to the United States. In any case, it is likely that the United States
and Mexico will become increasingly interdependent and that this relationship will be more balanced than in the past. In most instances one
side's gain implies a mutual gain, rather than a loss to the other side.
And because interdependence is greatest along the border, this part of
the United States should reap relatively large gains from Mexico's economic development.
Of course, without meaningful international cooperation, issues involving water availability and the environment could prove to be exceptions to this generally positive scenario. Careful reading of plans prepared
by various Texas borderlands development agencies does not reveal any
great concern about water availability problems, even though most of the
area is quite arid. Some portions of the Middle Rio Grande have had to
shift to crops that require less frequent irrigation, but the Amistad Reservoir has produced a major recharge of underground water in its vicinity.
Residential and industrial water use in the Lower Rio Grande Valley
increasingly competes with agricultural uses, but there seems to be some
willingness to make this trade-off in order to diversify the local economy
and expand employment opportunities. Then, too, development-oriented
organizations may simply be loathe to dwell on water problems, even
though typical assessments find water shortages in all of the Rio Grande
Basin except in the headwaters area. 26 Texas law acknowledges that underground water will run out eventually by granting farmers a depletion
allowance, but farmers and other users are allowed to pump away, racing
each other to the bottom of the aquifer. Such undisciplined behaviorwhether it involves water consumption or negative environmental externalities-is even more difficult to bring under control when the parties
involved are in different countries, as is the case along the MexicanU.S. border.
Continuing rapid growth in the borderlands will involve greater de25. Vanneph, P61e petrolier etfrontiere: Reynosa (Mexique), 18 CAHIERS DES AMERIQUES
LATINES 19-23 (1978).
26. J. Dobson and A. Sheperd, Water Availability for Energy in 1985 and 1990, 3-44 (Oct.
1979) (Oak Ridge Nat'l. Lab. Report).
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mands on water and the environment, not only because there will be
more people, but also because per capita income levels will be higher.
Successful management of the problems ahead will require greater transboundary cooperation; but since one side does not have the authority to
deal concretely with problems originating on the other, such cooperation
really implies a commitment to clean up one's own act. Mexican and
U.S. colleagues present here are much more expert than I concerning
what this involves in detail.

PATRONES DE CRECIMIENTO ECONOMICO EN LAS TIERRAS FRONTERIZAS TEJANAS
Las actividades tradicionales manufactureras se han cambiado a las tierras fronterizas
tejanas a causa de la descentralizaci6n en los EUA y por los sueldos bajos y mano
de obra abundante en Tejas. Sin embargo las manufacturas son s6lo una pequefia parte
del empleo total debido a la mano de obra mAs barata allende la frontera. En el futuro
el incremento en la manufactura, asf como la industrializaci6n y el desarrollo de
recursos mexicanos, pueden ayudar a toda la regi6n.
Descentralizaci6n de la actividad manufacturera en los EUA
La actividad manufacturera en los EUA se ha desplazado de las regiones noroeste y norte central
al sur y al oeste. Esto puede ser mejor explicado por los ciclos de vida de los productos y la filtraci6n
espacial industrial.
El ciclo de vida de un producto tiene tres fases que requieren distintas habilidades y tipos de
capital. La fase temprana de habilidades usa capital bajo, dependiendo de economfas externas y su
contrataci6n. La fase de crecimiento usa t6cnicas de producci6n en masa y habilidades de direcci6n
que incrementan la proporci6n entre el capital y el trabajo. Finalmente la fase madura maneja
producci6n rudimentaria que usa trabajo barato y de poca habilidad como el insumo humano clave.
Para permanecer competitivas, las compafifas cambian la localizaci6n de su producci6n respondiendo
a las necesidades cambiantes en el ciclo del producto.
Las actividades tradicionales manufactureras se han cambiado a las tierras fronterizas tejanas
porque otras Areas en fase madura han creado nuevas actividades tecnol6gicas. Nueva Inglaterra,
California y Nueva York hoy tiene atractivo para la industria moderna, incluida la inversi6n extranjera,
gracias a los avances en aspectos aeroespaciales, electr6nicos y de computadoras.
Crecimiento manufacturero en las tierrasfronterizas tejanas
Los bajos salarios en las tierras fronterizas tejanas y los altos niveles de desempleo han atrafdo
a compafifas que sobreviven sobre angostos margenes de utilidad, como los que fabrican vestuario.
La manufactura, aunque se ha mds que duplicado en estas Areas, constituye s6lo una pequefia
parte del uso total de fuerza de trabajo. Esto puede ser explicado por sus salarios bajos, empleo sin
registro y la obtenci6n de mano de obra an mis barata allende la frontera.
El escenario internacional
Las plantis manufactureras que pueden tener utilidades se han cambiado a ciudades fronterizas
mexicanas. El programa de maquiladoras permite la importaci6n temporal de materiales a Mdxico
bajo la condici6n de que el producto se envfe afuera. Nuestras leyes aduanales imponen derechos
s6lo sobre el valor agregado.
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En la Ailtima d~cada estos proyectos le han dado a M6xico 95,000 empleos, excediendo en mucho
los empleos en manufactura de las tierras fronterizas tejanas. Mientras que esto significa precios
mds bajos para los consumidores en los EUA, algunos argumentan que estamos perdiendo empleos
para trabajadores nacionales. Sin embargo, no hay pruebas de que estas compaifas permanecerlan
activas o no se irian a otro pals si el programa terminara. El trabajo hecho en la industria maquiladora
estS generalmente ligado a actividades complementarias en los EUA aunque mucho de 61 sobrepasa
la frontera. Tambidn el comercio local al menudeo puede beneficiarse con servicios de orden ms
alto.
El estado econ6mico de la poblaci6n de las tierrasfronterizas
Existe una relaci6n inversa entre el ingreso per cipita y el porcentaje de origen hispdnico en todas
las ciudades de la frontera. El hiato en el ingreso absoluto per cApita entre el resto del pais y las
tierras fronterizas sigue siendo grande pero debe tomarse en cuenta el bajo costo de vida en esta
regi6n. Los que toman decisiones en la politica de los EUA deben enfrentarse a problemas de
educaci6n, discriminaci6n y competencia con los trabajadores mexicanos pero tambi6n deben de
tomar en cuenta que los logros educativos de las tierras fronterizas y sus ganancias han avanzado
con mayor rapidez que los del resto de los EUA.
Anticipando el futuro
Existe poca posibilidad de que las tierras fronterizas sean testigos de grandes innovaciones en el
futuro. Los limites del agua y el incremento en la mecanizaci6n limitarin las oportunidades agrfcolas
y ganaderas. Las manufacturas probablemente se incrementarin y el crecimiento en las maquiladoras
beneficiara a las actividades complementarias y a las ventas al menudeo de los EUA. Puede haber
oportunidad para elevar el nivel industrial y las capacidades y los ingresos de los trabajadores
industriales. Como en el sur de los EUA, la atracci6n inicial de sectores de salarios bajos puede
Ilevar a una gran expansi6n de industrias de apoyo haciendo que la dependencia de trabajo barato
ya no sea necesaria para la promoci6n de la industrializaci6n. Finalmente el empleo federal civil y
los aumentos en el gasto militar probablemente acelerardn el crecimiento en El Paso.
El programa de maquiladoras, junto con el desarrollo mexicano de petr6leo y gas hardn a los
EUA mds interdependiente con Mdxico. La mayor parte de este fen6meno ocurrirA en la frontera y
debe de ayudar a la regi6n.
Mayores demandas de agua resultarn de los incrementos en la poblaci6n y en los niveles de
ingreso per cApita. La cooperaci6n transfronteriza, para que tenga 6xito, requerirS un compromiso
de cada pals de purificar su propia agua.

